Criminal Procedure: Search, Seizure, and Confession by Kollman, Ruth A. & Goranson, Ronald L.
SMU Law Review
Volume 45
Issue 4 Annual Survey of Texas Law Article 13
1991




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation





Ronald L Goranson **
EXAS criminal defense lawyers will hail 1991 as the year the Court
of Criminal Appeals resurrected the Texas Constitution. The intern-
ment had lasted almost fifty years.' The Court of Criminal Appeals
had ended 1990 by reaffirming in December that the "Texas Constitution
does not impose any greater restrictions on police conduct than those im-
posed by the Fourth Amendment."' 2 The first flicker of life came in January
of 1991 with the court's holding that the Texas Constitution affords greater
double jeopardy protection than that provided by the federal Constitution.3
By midyear the court had denounced its own very recent holdings4 and an-
nounced it would now separately analyze state and federal constitutional due
process claims. 5 The revival has broad implications. The most significant
impact is in the areas of search and seizure and confession.
I. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
A. The Emergence of Independent State Constitutional Grounds
In Goodwin v. State the Court of Criminal Appeals rejected Goodwin's
* B.A., North Texas State University; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Associate,
Milner, Goranson, Sorrels, Udashen, Wells & Parker, Dallas, Texas.
** B.B.A., University of Arkansas; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Partner, Mil-
ner, Goranson, Sorrels, Udashen, Wells & Parker, Dallas, Texas.
1. See Crowell v. State, 147 Tex. Crim. 299, 180 S.W.2d 343 (1944), which held that
"Art. I, Sec. 9, of the Constitution of this State, and the 4th Amendment to the Federal Consti-
tution are, in all material aspects, the same." Id., 147 Tex. Crim. at 304, 180 S.W.2d at 346.
2. Gordon v. State, 801 S.W.2d 899, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
3. State v. Torres, 805 S.W.2d 418, 420-21 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (rejecting United
States Supreme Court dicta in Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 37 & n.15 (1978) by holding that
double jeopardy attaches in a bench trial in Texas when both sides announce ready and the
defendant pleads to the charging instrument, not when the first witness is sworn).
4. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 803 S.W.2d 272, 288 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (quoting
Eisenhauer v. State, 754 S.W.2d 159, 162 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 848 (1988))
("Article I § 9 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitu-
tion are 'in all material aspects the same.' "), cert. denied, Ill S.Ct. 2914 (1991); Bower v.
State, 769 S.W.2d 887, 903 (Tex. Crim. App.) (continuing to "interpret our Texas constitution
in harmony with the Supreme Court's opinions interpreting the Fourth Amendment"), cert.
denied, 492 U.S. 927 (1989); Eisenhauer v. State, 754 S.W.2d 159, 164 (Tex. Crim. App.)
(Article I, section 9 of the Texas Constitution is the same as the federal Constitution in deter-
mining probable cause), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 848 (1988), overruled by Heitman v. State, 815
S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
5. Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681, 690 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
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claim that the search of the car in which he was riding was improper because
it flowed from a pretext arrest. 6 The arresting officer testified that the car
did not signal a right turn. The officer stopped the car. The officer saw one
of the back seat passengers make a downward movement with the upper
portion of his body. When Goodwin opened the front passenger door of the
car, one of the officers saw what seemed to be an illegal knife. The arresting
officer said he had thought, before the car made the turn, that it might be
necessary to check the people in the car. He reiterated, however, that he
stopped the car simply because the occupants violated the law, not because
he wanted to search them. The court found that there was no pretext
arrest.7 In addition, once the car was legally stopped the officers could take
reasonable measures for their own safety.8 From their observations, the of-
ficers could have reasonably believed that the occupants might have been in
possession of additional weapons. 9 The officers' observation of an illegal
knife justified a continued and more extensive search of the passenger com-
partment and containers located in the car.'0 In its discussion of the pretext
arrest doctrine, the court noted that the Fifth Circuit had overruled the fed-
eral case upon which the Texas line of cases prohibiting pretext arrests was
based." The court held that the evidence in Goodwin showed no pretext
arrest.' 2 Because it found Goodwin's arrest was not based on a pretext, the
Court of Criminal Appeals in Goodwin deemed it unnecessary to discuss the
lawfulness of pretext arrests in Texas.13
The pretext issue arose again in Gordon v. State.14 Authorities arrested
Gordon on an arrest warrant based on an outstanding municipal court war-
rant, then searched his apartment. Gordon confessed to another crime. In
analyzing the prohibition against pretext arrests, the court noted that pretext
seizures generally involve investigatory stops where (1) there is no initial
suspicion that the detainee has committed a crime, or (2) there is a tempo-
rary detention or arrest of an individual suspected of having committed a
crime.' 5 The act that authorities suspect the person of having committed is
almost never the conduct initiating the detention or seizure.' 6 Under earlier
Texas case law, the possession by police of a valid warrant did not affect the
basic proposition that authorities could not use an arrest for one crime as a
pretext to search for evidence of another crime. 17 The Fifth Circuit, how-
6. Goodwin v. State, 799 S.W.2d 719, 725, 728 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990), cert. denied, 11
S.Ct. 2913 (1991).
7. Id. at 726.
8. Id. at 727.
9. Id. at 728.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 725 (citing United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 1184 (5th Cir. 1987) (over-
ruling Amador-Gonzalez v. United States, 391 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1968))).
12. Id. at 726.
13. Id.
14. Gordon v. State, 801 S.W.2d 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
15. Id. at 903.
16. Id.
17. See Black v. State, 739 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (overruled by Gordon,
801 S.W.2d 899).
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ever, recently rejected the subjective intent test for finding a pretext arrest -
that a court may look at the subjective intent of the police at the time of the
arrest. 18 Most circuits now agree an objective, rather than a subjective, anal-
ysis is proper. 19 An arrest or search without probable cause will generally be
redeemed if evidence shows that police officers acted in objective good faith,
and the officers have done no more than that objectively allowed by law.20
Their subjective motives in doing what the law permits are irrelevant to a
suppression inquiry. 21
Gordon also argued that the complaint on which the magistrate issued the
arrest warrant was wholly conclusory and did not contain any factual infor-
mation to show the underlying basis of the affiant's conclusions. The court
noted that a complaint must allege facts to establish that the affiant had
personal knowledge of the averments of illegal activity. 22 A magistrate must
evaluate facts to determine if probable cause exists. Without facts, the judge
cannot make an independent determination of probable cause. In the
Gordon affidavit, the affiant recited that he or she had good reason to believe
that Gordon had unlawfully failed to appear in a municipal court. The affi-
davit did not contain any facts about why Gordon's failure to appear was
unlawful or how the affiant came to have this knowledge. Thus, the affiant
did not have the indicia of reliability necessary to permit a magistrate to
make a proper evaluation. The Court of Criminal Appeals found the com-
plaint did not set out probable cause.23 Gordon's arrest pursuant to the war-
rant issued on the complaint was illegal. 24 The search of Gordon's
apartment and his confession came after his illegal arrest. Article 38.23(b)
of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure25 makes evidence taken in viola-
tion of the law admissible if an officer obtains the evidence while acting in
objective and good-faith reliance on a warrant based on probable cause.26
The Court of Criminal Appeals held that article 38.23(b) does not apply if
the warrant is not based on probable cause, regardless of the good-faith reli-
ance of the officer.27 The trial court should have excluded the confession
18. See United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 1184-85 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc). To the
extent Black, stands for the proposition disavowed in Causey, the Court of Criminal Appeals
has overruled it. Gordon, 801 S.W.2d at 911.
19. See, United States v. Mitchell, 951 F.2d 1291, 1295 (D.C. Cir., 1991); United States v.
Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037, 1041 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, Cummins v. United States, 112 S.Ct.
428 (1991); United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1517 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Archer, 840 F.2d 567, 572 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 941 (1988); United States v. Miller,
821 F.2d 546, 549 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v. Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210, 213 (3rd Cir.),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 833 (1987); United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 1184 (5th Cir. 1987)
(en banc); United States v. Smith, 643 F.2d 942, 944 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 875(1981); United States v. McCambridge, 551 F.2d 865, 870 (1st Cir. 1977). But see United
States v. Smith, 802 F.2d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 1986).
20. Gordon, 801 S.W.2d at 909.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 913 (citing Rumsey v. State, 675 S.W.2d 517, 519 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)).
23. Id. at 916.
24. Id.
25. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23(b) (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1991) (as
amended effective Sept. 1, 1987).
26. Gordon, 801 S.W.2d at 912-13.
27. Id. Accord, Curry v. State, 808 S.W.2d 481, 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
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unless intervening circumstances had relieved the taint of the illegal proce-
dure.28 The Eastland court of appeals had not reviewed whether the taint of
the illegal arrest was sufficiently dissipated. Accordingly, the Court of
Criminal Appeals remanded Gordon to the Eastland court to determine if
intervening circumstances had purged the taint.29
In reaching its conclusion in Gordon, the Court of Criminal Appeals held
that no greater restrictions on police conduct are imposed by the Texas Con-
stitution than by the Fourth Amendment. 30 The first sparks of life in the
Texas Constitution do flicker in Judge Davis' opinion, however:
This is not to say we shall merely "parrot" the opinions of the Supreme
Court; but, where the federal and state constitutional provisions are in
all material aspects the same, this Court is free to "follow the lead" of
the Supreme Court where the position has a logical and equitable basis
and it appears our own state interests will also be served. 31
Judge Clinton concurred; Judge Teague dissented. Three judges (Judges
Campbell, Miller, and Baird) concurred but considered the pretext arrest
portion of the opinion dicta since the arrest warrant was invalid. 32 It would
take another six months for the court to revitalize the Texas Constitution.
The legal Lazarus took the form of the unconscious William Randolph
Heitman. 33 Officers found Heitman slumped in his car in a convenience
store parking lot. After they searched him and discovered a loaded pistol,
officers arrested him. When they inventoried his car, the officers found a
locked briefcase in the passenger compartment. They jimmied open the
briefcase and found methamphetamine. After conviction for possession of
the drug, Heitman appealed the trial court's adverse ruling on his motion to
suppress.
The Heitman analysis began with the conclusion "Today we reserve for
ourselves the power to interpret our own constitution. ' 34 The court ac-
knowledged that the Texas Constitution cannot subtract from the rights
guaranteed by the federal Constitution.35 A state constitution may, how-
ever, afford greater protection than the federal Constitution. 36 The Heit-
man court also noted that the Supreme Court's interpretation of a Fourth
Amendment claim is permissive authority when considering a parallel claim
under article I, section 9 of the Texas Constitution.37 The court concluded
that the framers of the Texas Constitution were not necessarily aware of or
in agreement with the federal drafters' constitutional intent. 38 Similar lan-
28. Gordon, 801 S.W.2d at 916.
29. Id. at 917.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 912.
32. Id. at 917.
33. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
34. Heitman, 815 S.W.2d at 682.
35. Id. at 682 (citing Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967)).
36. Id. at 683 (citing Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975)).
37. Id. at 690 & n.22.
38. See id. at 685, 690.
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guage does not necessarily equal similar intent and interpretation.39 The
court also cautioned in a footnote that merely citing article I, section 9 in a
brief will not preserve error on appeal. 40 Counsel must argue and cite au-
thority for the urged state constitutional construction.4' The state constitu-
tional claim should be a separate ground of error on appeal, apart from any
federal constitutional ground.42 Otherwise, the appellate court may hold the
entire lumped ground to be multifarious and not consider it.43
Heitman's reach may exceed the grasp of its actual holding. The court's
different drafters, different intent rationale applies with equal force to any
provision of the Texas Constitution, not just article I, section 9. The Court
of Criminal Appeals did not hold that the inventory search of Heitman's
locked briefcase violated the Texas Constitution. It merely remanded the
case to the Fort Worth Court of Appeals to re-analyze the independent state
ground in light of the high court's conclusion that a state constitutional anal-
ysis does not have to comport with federal Fourth Amendment
interpretations."
B. DWI Roadblocks
In 1990 the United States Supreme Court in Michigan Department of
State Police v. Sitz held that DWI roadblocks in Michigan did not violate the
Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure.
45
The Supreme Court focused on the presence in Michigan of a legislatively
developed administrative scheme that provided authority to police to collect
evidence at sobriety checkpoints. The scheme also limited the officers' dis-
cretion in conducting the stops.46 The Court of Criminal Appeals deter-
mined that this Supreme Court decision overruled its recent holding that the
Fourth Amendment prohibited Texas DWI checkpoints. 47
One result of Sitz was that the Court of Criminal Appeals remanded sev-
eral cases to the courts of appeals for reconsideration. In one of the first
39. See id. at 689.
40. Id. at 690 n.23.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. Several judges on the Court of Criminal Appeals have stressed this briefing re-
quirement in presentations to CLE seminars. See, Chuck Miller, Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals Update, at D-5 to D-6, in The Advanced Criminal Law Course (State Bar of Texas,
1991). They mean it. See also Schalk v. State, No. 665-89, 1991 WL 194072, at *11 (Tex.
Crim. App. October 2, 1991) ("The question of whether our state constitution should provide
more protection than the federal constitution in this case was not presented in the appellants'
second ground for review, and we therefore express no opinion on that issue.").
44. Heitman, 815 S.W.2d at 690.
45. Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2488 (1990).
46. Id. at 2486-87.
47. King v. State, 800 S.W.2d 528, 529 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990), overruling Higbie v. State,
780 S.W.2d 228 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). The Court of Criminal Appeals remanded King to
the Dallas court of appeals for reconsideration in light of Sitz. On remand the Dallas court
distinguished Sitz, noting that Texas has no legislatively-developed administrative scheme like
that of Michigan. King v. State, 816 S.W.2d 447, 451 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ ref'd.).
Accordingly, the Dallas court held that the roadblock violated both the Fourth Amendment
and art. I, § 9 of the Texas Constitution. Id.
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cases decided on remand, State v. Wagner, Dallas court of appeals held that
Texas DWI roadblocks violate the Fourth Amendment because Texas has
no administrative scheme authorizing the stops. 48 The Dallas court distin-
guished driver's license and insurance checkpoints from DWI roadblocks by
noting that no regulatory agency enforces drunk driving prohibitions in
Texas. 49 Distilling Heitman, the Dallas court held that the roadblock vio-
lated the defendant's article I, section 9 rights, as well as his Fourth Amend-
ment rights, noting that the Texas Constitution provides at least as much
protection as the Fourth Amendment.50
C. Search and Arrest Warrants
1. Probable Cause
In Rojas v. State5 1 the defendant was convicted of possession of mari-
juana. The Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed the case to determine if a
plainly-secondhand tip received from an anonymous informer gave sufficient
probable cause under both the Texas and federal Constitutions. A police
officer received an anonymous phone call from an informer who claimed to
have been advised there was marijuana in the trunk of Rojas's vehicle and
that Rojas would be attending a local funeral. There was no evidence that
the informer had personal knowledge of the marijuana. The corroborating
information - that Rojas would be attending the funeral of a family mem-
ber - had been shown on local news broadcasts. The tip did not contain
any other information to show the informer's special or personal knowledge.
The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that it was not reasonable to de-
termine that the informer's information about attendance at a funeral gave
credence to the informer's marijuana tip.52 When an anonymous tip fur-
nishes the probable cause for a search, under the totality-of-the-circum-
stances test the probability that the contraband will be found in the indicated
location must be supported by either the informer's claim of personal knowl-
edge or other facts demonstrating that the probability is reasonable.5 3 The
court held probable cause was lacking.5 4
In Hass v. State the Court of Criminal Appeals held that police lacked
probable cause to search a mini-warehouse for drugs.55 The affidavit sup-
porting the search warrant was based in part on information from a confi-
dential informant that Hass had a quantity of amphetamine and
manufactured it at his residence. Six months of surveillance preceded the
search. The police observed a vehicle at the miniwarehouse. They saw the
subjects put an unknown item in the car and drive off. Police stopped the
48. State v. Wagner, No. 05-89-00675-CR, 1991 WL 236892, at *1 (Tex. App.-Dallas
Nov. 14, 1991, writ pending).
49. Id. at *1, *3.
50. Id. at *3.
51. Rojas v. State, 797 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
52. Id. at 44.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Hass v. State, 790 S.W.2d 609, 610 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
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car. They could smell the odor of phenylacetic acid, an ingredient of am-
phetamine. The Court of Criminal Appeals found several of the statements
in the affidavit misleading. 56 It noted the mere fact that the suspects had
illegal drugs in their automobile after leaving a miniwarehouse did not, with-
out additional facts linking the miniwarehouse with the drugs, justify search-
ing the miniwarehouse for additional drugs.5 7 It reversed on probable cause
grounds.5 8
2. Scope
In State v. Barnett5 9 the police executed a search warrant at a home.
While the search was underway, Barnett, who was not named in the warrant
affidavit, drove up in his car. Officers immediately arrested him. They
searched his car and found amphetamines in the car. The Court of Criminal
Appeals held that the search of Barnett's car violated both article I, section 9
of the Texas Constitution and the Fourth Amendment. 6° The court ob-
served that the affidavit supporting the warrant authorizing search of the
house did not provide probable cause to believe that every vehicle on the
premises contained contraband. 6 1
3. Good-Faith Reliance on Warrant
Article 38.23(b) of the Texas Rules of Criminal Procedure62 provides that
evidence taken in violation of the law is admissible if an officer obtains the
evidence while acting in objective and good-faith reliance on a warrant based
on probable cause. In Gordon v. State the Court of Criminal Appeals held
that if the warrant is not based on probable cause, then 38.23(b) does not
apply regardless of the good-faith reliance of the officer. 63 Police suspected
that Gordon had committed a robbery and a sexual assault. They did not
have probable cause to arrest. They discovered an outstanding arrest war-
rant issued by a municipal court on Gordon's failure to appear. Pursuant to
an arrest warrant based on the outstanding municipal court warrant, the
authorities arrested Gordon. They searched his apartment. They interro-
gated him about the robbery and assault. The evidence consisted of the
testimony of the complainant and Gordon's videotaped and written confes-
sions. The complainant said she got only a glimpse of her attacker. She was
not able to positively identify Gordon; however, she said there were no no-
ticeable differences in appearance between Gordon and her attacker.
Gordon's confession was far more specific. The Eastland Court of Appeals
56. Id. at 611-12.
57. Id. at' 612.
58. Id. at 610.
59. State v. Barnett, 788 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
60. Id. at 573, 577.
61. Id. at 576.
62. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23(b) (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1991) (as
amended, effective Sept. 1, 1987).
63. Gordon v. State, 801 S.W.2d 899, 912-13 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Accord, Curry v.
State, 808 S.W.2d 481, 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
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relied on the article 38.23(b) good-faith exception to an illegal arrest situa-
tion in upholding Gordon's conviction. 6 The Court of Criminal Appeals
disagreed. The court noted that the officers had obtained the evidence in
Gordon's case in June of 1987.65 Article 38.23(b) did not go into effect until
September 1, 1987 and was not applicable to evidence obtained prior to that
date.66 More importantly, the court distinguished the requirements of
United States v. Leon 67 from the language of article 38.23(b). 68 The good-
faith exception articulated in Leon 69 permits an exception if a police officer's
probable cause belief is reasonable.70 Article 38.23(b) requires a threshold
finding of probable cause. 71 As a result, the good-faith exception could not
support the arrest and search. 72 The Court of Criminal Appeals remanded a
similar case, Curry v. State, for reconsideration in light of Gordon.73 The
Houston court of appeals had held that Curry's arrest and search was lawful,
even though the supporting affidavits did not show probable cause, because
the arresting officer acted in good faith in arresting Curry on outstanding
traffic warrants. 74
4. Technical Defects
In Green v. State 75 the search warrant showed that the magistrate signed
and issued it on March 20. It also showed that the authorities did not exe-
cute the warrant until March 25. Article 18.07 of the Texas Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure76 requires authorities to execute a search warrant within three
whole days, excluding the days of issuance and execution. The warrant here
was executed one day late. Calling this a "technical defect" (as opposed to a
defect in probable cause), the Court of Criminal Appeals permitted the con-
sideration of evidence, other than the controversial documents, to show that
a clerical error caused the technical defect. 77 If, at a hearing on a motion to
suppress, a magistrate or clerk (1) states that the date on the face of the
warrant is wrong; and (2) testifies to the date on which the warrant actually
was issued, which date shows the authorities timely executed the warrant,
then the warrant is valid notwithstanding the "technical" error. 78 The State
did not elicit such testimony in Green. The court held that the warrant had
64. Gordon v. State, 767 S.W.2d 866, 868 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1989), rev'd, 801 S.W.2d
899 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
65. Gordon, 801 S.W.2d at 912.
66. Id.
67. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
68. Gordon, 801 S.W.2d at 912-13.
69. Leon, 468 U.S. at 913, 919-20.
70. See Gordon, 801 S.W.2d at 912; United States v. Logan, 949 F.2d 1370, 1379 n.15
(5th Cir. 1991).
71. Gordon, 801 S.W.2d at 912.
72. Id. at 913.
73. Curry v. State, 808 S.W.2d 481, 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
74. Curry v. State, 780 S.W.2d 825, 826 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990),
vacated by 808 S.W.2d 481 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
75. Green v. State, 799 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
76. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.07 (Vernon 1981).
77. Green, 799 S.W.2d at 760.
78. See id. at 758-59.
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no force or effect after March 24th.79 The trial court should have suppressed
the fruits of the search conducted pursuant to the expired warrant.8 0
D. Warrantless Arrests
1. On Probable Cause
In Beverly v. State the court held that probable cause for arrest under
article 14.01(b) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedures' may be partly
based on reasonably trustworthy information.8 2 The arresting officer was
familiar with loiterers at an apartment complex. The manager told the of-
ficer he had warned Beverly about trespassing. The officer saw Beverly drive
up. In searching him incident to an arrest for criminal trespass, the officer
found cocaine. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that an officer may base
a warrantless arrest on the officer's prior knowledge and personal observa-
tions, combined with another person's reasonably trustworthy information,
in making a probable cause assessment.8 3
2. Scope
In California v. Acevedo the Supreme Court limited the scope of a war-
rantless search to the specific object which gives rise to the probable cause to
search.84 Police saw Acevedo leave his apartment. He was carrying a
brown paper bag. He put the bag in his trunk. Officers stopped the car,
opened the trunk, and seized the bag. In analyzing the law applicable to
closed containers in cars, the Court relied on the rules enunciated in United
States v. Chadwick85 and Arkansas v. Sanders8 6 and noted the sometimes
conflicting applications.8 7 Chadwick prohibited the warrantless search of a
closed container in a car.88 Sanders extended Chadwick to a suitcase actu-
ally being transported in the trunk of a car.89 The rationale behind both
cases was the owner's heightened privacy interest in personal luggage. The
presence of the luggage in an automobile did not diminish the owner's expec-
tation of privacy. 90 The Court noted that strict application of the Sanders-
Chadwick rule to Acevedo's paper sack would have required the authorities
to get a warrant before opening the bag. The Court held that the Fourth
Amendment is not applied differently to the search of a container within an
automobile than to the search of the vehicle. 91 It explicitly overruled the
79. See id at 757.
80. See id.
81. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 14.01(b) (Vernon 1977).
82. Beverly v. State, 792 S.W.2d 103, 104-05 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
83. Id. at 105.
84. California v. Acevedo, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 1991 (1991).
85. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
86. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), overruled by California v. Acevedo, 111
S.Ct. 1982, 1989-91 (1991).
87. Acevedo, 111 S.Ct. at 1989-91.
88. See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 11-13.
89. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 765; see, Acevedo, 111 S.Ct. at 1987.
90. See Acevedo, 111 S.Ct. at 1986-87.
91. Id at 1989, United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-22 (1982) (warrantless search of
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closed-container warrant requirement in Sanders.92 In dicta, the Supreme
Court noted that the officer's probable cause to search the paper bag did not
extend to a search of the entire vehicle.
3. The Inventory Exception
In Moberg v. State93 the police had arrested Moberg at a motel pursuant
to a valid arrest warrant. After taking him to the police station, officers
returned to the motel room the same evening and removed Moberg's belong-
ings. They inventoried the belongings and took everything to the police de-
partment's property room. Among Moberg's belongings were photographs
of nude young girls and of an adult male engaged in sexual activity with
various young girls. The arresting officers did not conduct a search contem-
poraneous with their arrest of Moberg. Instead they obtained a warrant,
which apparently did not comply with article 18.01(c) of the Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure94. The State did not, however, rely on the search warrant.
Several days after the seizure investigators identified two of the girls in the
photographs. The authorities brought charges against Moberg. The State
defended the search on two grounds: first, the hotel manager had consented
to the search; and second, the seizure was pursuant to an inventory search.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Moberg testified about his expec-
tation of privacy in the hotel room. He said he had registered for the night
and he intended to check out sometime the following morning. The Court of
Criminal Appeals held that the hotel manager could not consent to the
search before the expiration of Moberg's rental term for the room.95 The
court noted that a guest in a hotel room is protected against unreasonable
searches and seizures because of the expectation of privacy a traveler has
even in temporary guest quarters.96
An inventory search is usually proper when authorities legitimately pos-
sess the belongings or containers of an arrestee. 97 The court looked to fac-
tors which would make an inventory search of a motel room reasonable.
Property left by patrons at the motel Moberg checked into was kept by the
motel for six months. Moberg did not ask the police to take custody of the
property, nor did he make arrangements for friends to recover the property.
Thus it is unclear whether the police could have been liable for leaving the
property alone. The officers did not perform the search under any standard-
ized criteria or policy. An inventory search must be done in accordance
automobile could include search of a container inside car when search was supported by prob-
able cause); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (distinguishing between the
need for a warrant to search a dwelling and that to search a movable vessel).
92. Acevedo, Ill S.Ct. at 1991.
93. Moberg v. State, 810 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
94. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.01(c) (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1991) (as
amended effective June 11, 1979).
95. Moberg, 810 S.W.2d at 196-97.
96. Id. at 194 (citing Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); Tarwater v. State, 160
Tex. Crim. 59, 267 S.W.2d 410 (1954)).
97. Id.
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with an established policy9 8 , which the State in Moberg neither followed nor
proved up. The inventory search doctrine cannot be invoked as a ruse or
asserted after the fact to legitimate an illegal search for evidence. 99 The
search of Moberg's hotel room did not meet the criteria established for a
proper inventory search.1°°
4. The Good-Faith Exception
In Hall v. State '0 an informer told a deputy sheriff, who told the sheriff,
who told a federal special agent, that Hall possessed a rifle in his home. The
agent checked and found that Hall had previously been convicted of a fel-
ony. The agent consulted a gun expert who told him 90% of all firearms in
Texas were manufactured out of state. The agent decided Hall's rifle was
probably manufactured outside Texas and had traveled in interstate com-
merce in violation of federal statute. The agent got a search warrant. Dur-
ing the search, officers found a rifle and some marijuana. Hall was
prosecuted for the marijuana possession. The Court of Criminal Appeals
applied the totality-of-the-circumstances test and found that the warrant is-
sued by the magistrate was not based on allegations of fact establishing prob-
able cause to search Hall's residence.102 The court observed that the
statutory good-faith exception now found in article 38.23(b) of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure 0 3 did not go into effect until September 1,
1987, after Hall's trial, and therefore did not apply.' °4
5. The Protective Search Exception
In Worthey v. State 10 5 police executed a valid search warrant for a resi-
dence. A vehicle approached the premises during the search. Worthey and
a second person walked to the front porch. The police identified themselves
and told Worthey and her companion to keep their hands where they were.
Worthey clutched her purse, which was hanging from her right shoulder,
and turned to the side so that the purse was away from the officer. The
officer testified that he believed Worthey might have had a weapon. The
officer removed the purse and conducted a protective pat-down search of the
purse to feel for weapons. The officer could not determine whether there
was a weapon in the purse, so the officer decided to search the purse. When
he opened the bag, he found methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia.
The San Antonio court of appeals found the officer had a reasonable suspi-
cion to perform an exterior pat-down of the purse, but held that the officer
98. Id. at 195.
99. Id. at 196.
100. Id.
101. Hall v. State, 795 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
102. Id. at 197.
103. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN. art. 38.23(b) (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1991) (as
amended effective Sept. 1, 1987).
104. Hall, 795 S.W.2d at 197 n.4.
105. Worthey v. State, 805 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
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lacked probable cause to search. 106 In reversing the lower court, the Court
of Criminal Appeals noted that police may conduct a limited search for
weapons where they have reason to believe they are dealing with an armed
and dangerous individual, regardless of whether they have probable
cause.107 To legally conduct a protective search, an officer need only have a
reasonable belief; probable cause is not required.' 08 In order to assess the
reasonableness of the officer's conduct, specific and articulable facts must
appear in the record which would warrant a self-protective search for
weapons. 19
6. The Plain View and Mere Evidence Exceptions
In Joseph v. State110 a warrant authorized the search of Joseph's resi-
dence for marijuana. In executing the warrant, an officer discovered an en-
velope addressed to Joseph containing a greeting card asking Joseph to send
to its author something with which to get high. Joseph argued that a search
warrant does not authorize police to read the subject's mail. The State re-
sponded that the letter was in plain view once the envelope was opened. It
argued that the seizure satisfied the two prongs of the plain view doctrine' 1:
(1) the officer must be in a proper position to view the item or lawfully be on
the premises; and (2) the discovery of evidence must be immediately appar-
ent. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the plain view doctrine did
not apply because it required a showing of probable cause.1 2 Once the of-
ficer determined that the envelope did not contain marijuana, the ordinary
greeting card could not create a reasonable suspicion, much less probable
cause, that it was associated with criminal activity. 113 Once an officer fails
to discover signs of criminal activity, the officer may not search further.14
The court noted the illegality of general exploratory searches."15 Mere evi-
dence, however, not specifically listed in the warrant may be admissible
when three conditions are met: (1) the objects are reasonably related to the
offense being investigated; (2) the objects are discovered during a good-faith
search under a valid search warrant; and (3) the scope of the search is lim-
ited to the objects of the search and the places where there is probable cause
to believe they may be located.1 6 The court found that the letter contained
statements potentially connecting Joseph to drug possession. The letter was,
therefore, mere evidence. 117 It met the first condition. The officers con-
106. Worthey v. State, 773 S.W.2d 783, 785 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989), rev'd, 805
S.W.2d 435 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
107. Worthey, 805 S.W.2d at 437 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 30 (1968)).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 438.
110. Joseph v. State, 807 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
111. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990).
112. Joseph, 807 S.W.2d at 308.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 307 (citing Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965)).
116. Joseph, 807 S.W.2d at 307 (citing Warden v. Hayden, 307 U.S. 294, 307-10 (1967);
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982)).
117. Id.
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ducted the search pursuant to a valid search warrant""18, thus meeting the
second condition. The written contents of correspondence, however, could
not plausibly conceal contraband. 1" 9 The officer testified that he knew he
would not find marijuana before he read the card. The evidence failed to
meet the third condition. As a result, the officer improperly searched and
seized the contents of the card. 120 The court remanded for a harm
analysis. 121
7. The Good-Faith Exception to Warrantless Searches
In United States v. De Leon-Reyna 122 the Fifth Circuit applied the good-
faith exception when an officer objectively and reasonably believes he has an
adequate foundation to make a stop. The officer in De Leon-Reyna radioed
in the license number of a suspicious truck, but not follow his agency's code
word policy. The radio dispatcher misunderstood the license number, and
reported that the license number was issued to a vehicle other than the one
the officer was following. The stop and arrest followed. The court held that
the officer's good-faith reliance on the radio report was objectively reason-
able, despite the officer's negligence. 123
E. Investigative Stops
In Crockett v. State 24 two police officers were at a train station looking
for narcotics when they saw a car stop in front of the station. A woman left
the car and stood in line in the depot to purchase tickets to Chicago. Crock-
ett remained outside with the driver. A short time later, Crockett left the
car and took three pieces of baggage from the trunk. The driver left. The
woman purchased two tickets with about $900 in cash. When Crockett and
the woman began walking toward the trains, the police approached Crockett
and asked to speak with him. Crockett seemed nervous but told police he
was worried about missing his train, which was leaving the station in less
than fifteen minutes. The officers told him they were investigating narcotics
traffic and asked Crockett if he was carrying illegal drugs. Crockett replied
he was not. They then asked him for permission to search his bags. Crockett
asked them if they had a search warrant. The police admitted they did not,
but said they had the right to detain Crockett long enough to have a dog
smell the bags. Crockett then agreed to move the luggage to a location indi-
cated by the police. After an alert to the luggage by a drug-sniffing dog, the
officers opened the suitcases and found a large bundle of marijuana. The
Court of Criminal Appeals distinguished this case from the drug courier pro-
file case of United States v. Sokolow, l" 5 where evidence that Sokolow
118. Id. at 305.
119. Id. at 307.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 309.
122. United States v. De Leon-Reyna, 930 F.2d 396, 399 (5th Cir. 1991).
123. Id.
124. Crockett v. State, 803 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
125. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
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matched a drug courier profile, together with empirical data on such profiles,
provided sufficient cause for an investigative detention. 126 The Court of
Criminal Appeals noted that Crockett was traveling to Chicago, used cash to
purchase the tickets, looked around the train station lobby, spoke little with
his traveling companion, and became nervous when involuntarily detained in
public by narcotics officers. It concluded that Crockett's behavior did not
support an inference of wrongdoing. 127 The State introduced no empirical
evidence to suggest that persons traveling to Chicago are more likely to be
transporting illegal drugs than are persons traveling elsewhere. To be
grounds for detention, the suspect's demeanor must particularly indicate
drug trafficking, not merely eccentricity. 128 Crockett's behavior was not of
such character as to justify an involuntary investigative detention of all per-
sons exhibiting the behavior. 129 The Court held the detention improper.130
On the other end of the investigatory stop scale is Holladay v. State.13 '
Two police officers on narcotics detail at an airport observed Holladay and a
companion. Both appeared to be nervous. One of the officers asked Hol-
laday for permission to speak with him. After Holladay consented, the of-
ficer identified himself as a police officer. He did not tell Holladay he was
conducting an investigation or that he was a narcotics officer. The officer
asked Holladay if he had arrived on a flight. Holladay responded he had
not. The officer asked to see Holladay's plane ticket. Holladay responded he
had not purchased one. The officer asked Holladay about his companion.
Holladay denied knowing the companion. The officer then told Holladay
the companion had admitted knowing Holladay. At the officer's request,
Holladay showed the officer his identification. The officer asked permission
to look in Holladay's carry-on bag, telling Holladay he had the right to re-
fuse. Holladay consented to the search. The officer found two plane tickets
in Holladay's bag, only one of which had the correct name. The officer then
asked for permission to conduct a pat-down search, again telling Holladay
he had the right to refuse. Holladay consented. During the search, the of-
ficers detected a lump in one of Holladay's boots. The bulge turned out to be
cocaine. The Court of Criminal Appeals recalled that "not all encounters
between police and citizens invoke the protection of the Fourth Amendment.
It is only when police questioning of a citizen becomes a detention that it
must be supported by reasonable suspicion."' 3 2 In examining whether a de-
tention is supported by reasonable suspicion, a court looks at the totality of
the circumstances surrounding the detention.' 33 A "reasonable suspicion is
something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch,
but it is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of
126. Crockett, 803 S.W.2d at 312-13.
127. Id. at 311.
128. Id. at 313.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Holladay v. State, 805 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
132. Id. at 467 (citing Daniels v. State, 718 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. de-
nied, 479 U.S. 885 (1986) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
133. Id. at 471 (citing Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 9 (1989)).
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the evidence." 134 The officer approached Holladay after he had deplaned
from a flight from Miami, a known source of drugs. The court concluded
that the encounter did not implicate the Fourth Amendment because it was
consensual and the intrusion was limited. 135 The officer repeatedly told Hol-
laday he was free to leave and free to refuse any search. The court went on
to note that the encounter became an investigative detention when the officer
requested permission to search the luggage.136 The court concluded, how-
ever, that the police had sufficient articulable facts on which to base a rea-
sonable suspicion which justified the detention: (1) Holladay deplaned from
a flight from Miami; (2) he and his companion appeared nervous before the
contact with the officers; (3) Holladay lied about arriving on a flight from
Miami, he lied about travelling with the companion, and he lied about not
having a ticket; and (4) his nervousness increase4 when the officers asked for
his identification.' 37 The officer testified that, based on his past experience as
a drug investigator, he had concluded that Holladay fit the drug courier pro-
file. The court held that when these factors were considered together, they
were sufficiently probative to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity. 138
In Florida v. Bostick the Supreme Court reversed the Florida Supreme
Court's adoption of a per se rule defining every encounter on a bus as a
seizure.' 39 Officers in Florida routinely boarded buses at scheduled stops
and requested permission to search the passengers' luggage. Bostick con-
sented to the search. The officers found cocaine in his bag. The Texas
supreme court found that the Florida Supreme Court's focus on whether
Bostick felt free to leave the bus was too narrow.140 The court articulated a
more appropriate inquiry: "whether a reasonable person would feel free to
decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter."1 41 It
remanded the case to Florida for evaluation under the correct standard.' 42
No Texas court has applied Bostick to date.' 43 This area is ripe for a
Heitman state constitutional challenge.
F Abandonment
The Supreme Court in California v. Hodari D ,44 outlined the factors re-
quired to determine if a suspect has voluntarily abandoned seized property.
134. Id. at 469 (citing Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7 (1989)).
135. Id. at 471.
136. Id. at 472.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 473.
139. Florida v. Bostick, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2388 (1991).
140. Id. at 2387.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 2388.
143. The Dallas court of appeals addressed a bus search case in an unpublished opinion,
but disposed of the case on grounds unrelated to Bostick. We note the case not as authority
but as illustrative of the courts of appeals' analysis of issues similar to those addressed by the
Supreme Court. State v. McDowell, No. 05-90-01159-CR, 1991 WL 141619 (Tex. App.-
Dallas July 29, 1991, pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication).
144. California v. Hodari D., Il1 S.Ct. 1547 (1991).
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A police officer chased some youths who had fled at the approach of his
police car. When the officer closed in on him, Hodari tossed away a small
rock which turned out to be crack cocaine. Within moments, the officer
tackled Hodari and handcuffed him. The Supreme Court noted that seizure
under the Fourth Amendment requires either (1) the application of physical
force, however slight; or (2) in the absence of force, submission to an officer's
show of authority. 145 It concluded that the officer did not apply physical
force to Hodari since the officer did not touch him until after Hodari
dropped the drugs. 146 It also concluded, even assuming the officer's pursuit
was a show of authority to get Hodari to stop, that Hodari did not re-
spond. 147 The officer therefore did not seize Hodari until he tackled him. 14
The dissent characterized the majority opinion as a significant departure
from prior Fourth Amendment case law. 149
The Fifth Circuit applied the two-prong definition of seizure enunciated in
Hodari to a search that resulted from the defendant's consent to customs
officers to search a storage unit.150 The court noted a conflict in authority
between the circuits on the correct standard of review to apply to a trial
court's determination of whether a seizure occurred.151 It explicitly speci-




In Miffleton v. State the Court of Criminal Appeals held that, where a
DWI suspect was required to perform a sobriety test on videotape, but no
testimonial responses were called for, there was no violation of either the
Texas or the federal Constitutions.153 This holding applied only to the ad-
missibility of the visual recording. 154 In Jones v. State the court went further
and found that police questioning incident to the videotaped sobriety test,
which did not call for testimonial responses, did not constitute interrogation,
but was merely the normal activity related to the arrest of a DWI sus-
pect. 155 The court held that sobriety tests are no more than the collection of
physical evidence, both visual and aural.156 The court's exact language is
important:
As long as the suspect's statements are not used for their truth but as
circumstantial evidence from which the jury may infer degree of intoxi-
145. Id. at 1551.
146. Id. at 1550.
147. Id. at 1552.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1552 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
150. United States v. Valdiosera-Godinez, 932 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1991).
151. Id. at 1098 n.l.
152. Id.
153. Miffleton v. State, 777 S.W.2d 76, 81 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
154. Id..
155. Jones v. State, 795 S.W.2d 171, 172 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
156. Id. at 175, see also Chadwick v. State, 795 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
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cation, the attending officers could testify about the statements
anyway....
All of these considerations impel us to hold that audio tracks from
DWI videotapes should not be suppressed unless the police conduct de-
picted expressly or impliedly calls for a testimonial response not nor-
mally incident to arrest and custody or is conduct the police should
know is reasonably likely to elicit such a response.157
In Chadwick v. State 158 the Court of Criminal Appeals applied its Jones
decision to an officer's advice to Chadwick that the State did not have to
provide him with a lawyer until after he performed the sobriety tests. The
court held that Chadwick's verbal responses to the test questions and the
discussion about whether he would undergo breath or blood tests were not
testimonial. 159
B. Custodial Interrogation
In Melton v. State 160 a husband had learned his wife was unfaithful. To-
gether, they executed the wife's ex-lover. Several days after authorities dis-
covered the body, officers asked the wife to go with them to the police
station. They told her they thought she might have been the last person to
see the deceased. At the station she received her Miranda16' warning.
Within several hours she confessed. The Court of Criminal Appeals applied
four factors in determining that her detention was not custodial: (1) the
existence of probable cause to arrest: (2) whether the accused was under
investigation; (3) the subjective intent of the police; and (4) the subjective
belief of the accused. 162 The court held that when Melton gave her state-
ment, the investigation had not yet progressed from the investigatory to the
custodial stage. 163 The statement did not stem from custodial interroga-
tion. 164 The State did not have to show that Melton knowingly and intelli-
gently waived her privilege against self-incrimination.165 Melton was a close
case, a five-four decision. The dissenting judges were concerned that the
police put form over substance.' 66 They suspected the officers testified to the
required language to get by at trial.167 The case could easily have gone the
other way.
The facts in Meek v. State 16s did not make as close a case. The Court of
Criminal Appeals held that Meek was not the focus of an arson investigation
157. Jones, 795 S.W.2d at 175-76.
158. Chadwick v. State, 795 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
159. Id.
160. Melton v. State, 790 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
161. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
162. Melton, 790 S.W.2d at 325 (citing Turner v. State, 685 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. Crim. App.
1985); Ruth v. State, 645 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979)).
163. Id. at 325, 326.
164. Id. at 325.
165. Id. at 326.
166. See id. at 326 (Clinton, J., dissenting).
167. Id.
168. Meek v. State, 790 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
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at the time of his interview by a fire inspector.169 Nor was Meek in custody
during his visit to the fire inspector's office. 170 Meek came to the fire station
of his own free will at a time of his own choosing. The fire inspector allowed
him to step outside the building and go unaccompanied to his car during the
interviews. Meek left, unhindered, after the inspector took his statement.
Authorities did not formally arrest Meek until five weeks later. The court
held that the trial court did not err in permitting the State to offer the state-
ments against Meek, even though the fire inspector did not give him any
Miranda warnings before taking his statements.' 7 ' The court noted that the
court of appeals had applied the wrong test in determining that Meek was in
custody when he gave the statements, at least after he made incriminating
remarks. 172 The court outlined two acceptable approaches to analyzing a
custodial situation:173 first, "[o]ne approach merges the idea of 'focus' with
the idea of 'whether a reasonable person would believe that his freedom was
being deprived in a significant way;' "'174 and second, "[a]nother approach
cites four factors as relevant to the inquiry: probable cause to arrest, subjec-
tive intent of the police, focus of the investigation, and subjective belief of the
defendant."175
C. Corroboration of Oral Confessions
In Gribble v. State176 Gribble claimed the evidence was insufficient to
prove the elements of the offense by corroborating the statements of the de-
fendant. An extrajudicial confession of the accused is insufficient to support
a conviction unless it is corroborated. 177 Other evidence tending to show
that a crime was committed must corroborate the confession.17 8 The evi-
dence need not corroborate the identity of the perpetrator. 79 Identity is not
a part of the corpus delicti.180 An extrajudicial confession standing alone
may establish identity.' 8 ' The State had accused Gribble of committing
murder in the course of committing the offense of kidnapping. The corpus
delicti was therefore more than merely homicide by a criminal agency.' 8 2
Thus, the State had to produce evidence independent of Gribble's oral con-
169. Id. at 622.
170. Id.
171. Id at 622-23.
172. Id at 621.
173. Id
174. Id (quoting Shiflet v. State, 732 S.W.2d 622, 624 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)).
175. Id. (quoting Wicker v. State, 740 S.W.2d 779, 786 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), cert. de-
nied, 485 U.S. 938 (1988); Payne v. State, 579 S.W.2d 932, 933 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.]
1979)).
176. Gribble v. State, 808 S.W.2d 65 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2856
(1991).




181. Id. See Walter W. Steele, Jr. and Ruth A. Kollman, The Corpus Delicti of Murder
After Repeal of Article 1204, 20 VOICE FOR THE DEFENSE 10, 17 (June and July 1991).
182. Gribble, 808 S.W.2d at 71.
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fession to show his victim had been kidnapped.18 3 The evidence need not be
sufficient to prove the offense.' 84 The evidence need only make the corpus
delicti more probable than it would be without the evidence.' 8 5 The evi-
dence in Gribble showed there was no struggle at the victim's house. Au-
thorities found the victim about ten miles from her home. The evidence
supported the theory that a kidnapping had been committed. Gribble also
claimed that authorities had illegally obtained his confession. He argued
that without his confession the evidence was insufficient to connect him with
the offense. The Court of Criminal Appeals noted that a court must evaluate
the probative weight of all the evidence the trial judge permitted the jury to
consider, including erroneously admitted evidence, when determining the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction.18 6 The court therefore
declined to acquit Gribble and remanded the case for a new trial.1
8 7
In Port v. State '88 Port told police he had shot his victim twice in the
head. Port's father had previously turned over a gun that ballistics tests
later showed was the murder weapon. An autopsy corroborated Port's de-
scription of the fatal shots. The Court of Criminal Appeals found that the
statement contained true assertions of fact that established Port's guilt.189
The entire statement was admissible under article 38.22, section 3(c) of the
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. 19°
The Court of Criminal Appeals applied Port in Romero V State.191 The
court held that once it determines an oral statement was procured during
custodial interrogation, a reviewing court must then determine if the state-
ment is otherwise admissible under some exception to the general bar to
admissibility.' 92 The answer to this inquiry depends on whether the oral
statement "contains assertions of facts or circumstances that are found to be
true and which conduce to establish the guilt of the accused."' 93 Testimony
at the suppression hearing was conflicting and confusing about the sequence
of events leading to Romero's statement. Police officers testified they ap-
proached Romero at his home shortly after the victim was stabbed. The
officers stated that they had no intention of arresting him at that time. One
of the officers testified that, when Romero answered the door, the officer told
Romero two men had identified Romero as the man who stabbed the victim.
The officer said Romero said, "I stabbed him." When the officer asked him
where the knife was, he produced it from his pocket, saying, "Here it is."
The officers then arrested Romero.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id at 72.
186. Id. at 68.
187. Id. at 76.
188. Port v. State, 791 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
189. Id. at 108.
190. Port, 791 S.W.2d at 108, TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, § 3(c) (Vernon
1981).
191. Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).




Romero testified, through a Spanish interpreter, that officers came to his
home in the early morning hours. They told him he had been accused of
stabbing the victim. They said he had to go downtown. Romero testified
that he thought he was under arrest. He turned the knife over to the officers
because he was afraid that if he opposed them he would be resisting arrest.
He denied ever admitting he killed the victim. He did not identify the knife
as the one used to stab the victim. He told police, "I didn't do it" when they
asked him about the killing. The trial court did not file written findings and
conclusions, but in its order stated that Romero's oral statements to police
officers "were the result of custodial interrogation and not recorded or other-
wise admissible under Art. 38.22 .... ,,194 The Court of Appeals upheld the
State's appeal under the theory that the production of the knife used to com-
mit the stabbing made Romero's statements at his home admissible under
article 38.22, section 3(c).195 Romero argued on petition to the Court of
Criminal Appeals that the court below improperly reviewed the facts and
did not limit its review of the trial court's determinations. The Court of
Criminal Appeals agreed.' 96 The admissibility of an oral confession is a
question of both law and fact. 197 If the trial court's findings of fact have
support in the record, a reviewing court has no discretion to disturb them.' 98
The reviewing court can only determine if the trial court properly applied
the law to the facts.199 The trial court in Romero did not specify its reason
for finding the statement inadmissible. If the trial court's decision is correct
on any theory of the law, a reviewing court must sustain it.2° ° The testi-
mony conflicted about whether Romero either admitted the offense or identi-
fied the knife as the weapon used in the stabbing. The trial court could have
believed Romero and not the police officer. 20' The Court of Criminal Ap-
peals' inquiry did not end there. Even if the trial court found that Romero
did not identify the knife as the murder weapon, the facts showed that Ro-
mero did surrender a knife to police. If other independent evidence showed
that the knife was the murder weapon, then the other evidence might estab-
lish the facts found to be true, which would authorize admissibility of the
oral confession under section 3(c). 20 2
In contrast to Port, there was no evidence other than the officer's testi-
mony, denied by Romero, that Romero identified the knife as the murder
weapon. In Port ballistics tests showed Port's gun was the murder weapon.
The result of the autopsy also found to be true facts from Port's oral state-
ment. That was not the case in Romero. Implicit in Port is the concept that
"found to be true" refers to facts the police do not know about at the time of
194. Id. at 542.
195. State v. Romero, 763 S.W.2d 536, 538 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1988), rev'd, 800 S.W.2d
539 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
196. Romero, 800 S.W.2d at 543-44.




201. Id. at 544.
202. Id.
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the oral confession, but which, after the confession, prove to be true. 20 3
D. Waiver of Right to Counsel
In Goodwin v. State 2°4 Goodwin claimed that the trial court improperly
denied his motion to suppress his confession. Iowa authorities had arrested
him and put him in county jail. The court appointed an Iowa attorney to
represent Goodwin on the Iowa charges. The Iowa lawyer came to the jail
to confer with Goodwin. Texas officers were interviewing Goodwin about
some Texas incidents. The lawyer was advised of the interview by the Texas
officers but did not request to see Goodwin immediately. The lawyer left a
short time later. The Iowa authorities did not tell Goodwin that his attorney
was present at the station. Goodwin signed a confession and waiver of his
right to counsel. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that Goodwin's
waiver of counsel was not initiated by the failure to inform him of his law-
yer's presence.20 5 It noted that police "conduct is only relevant to the con-
stitutional validity of a waiver if it deprives a defendant of knowledge
essential to his ability to understand the nature of his rights and the conse-
quences of abandoning them." 2°6 If a suspect voluntarily decides to waive
counsel and knows and understands the Miranda warnings, then the waiver
is valid.207 The conduct of the police bore no relevance to the accused's
waiver, absent evidence that the police prevented Goodwin from knowing
and understanding his rights regarding the waiver. 208
E. Assertion of Right to Counsel
In Murphy v. State2° 9 officers arrested Murphy shortly after he had fled
the complainant's apartment. Two days later a police officer approached
him. The officer explained Murphy's Miranda rights. Murphy indicated
that he wanted to speak with his lawyer before speaking to police. The of-
ficer allowed Murphy to speak by telephone to his lawyer while in the of-
ficer's presence. A short time later, the officer approached Murphy again
and asked him if he wanted to explain what happened. Murphy replied that
he did. He answered the officer's questions. Murphy admitted the sexual
assault under investigation, as well as a second one. The officer testified
about the confession. Murphy testified and denied committing the sexual
assault. He denied telling the officer otherwise. The Court of Criminal Ap-
peals noted that once an accused invokes a right to counsel, the authorities
may not conduct further interrogation until counsel is present.210 An excep-
203. Id. at 544-45.
204. Goodwin v. State, 799 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct.
2913 (1991).
205. Id. at 730.
206. Id. at 729 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 424 (1986)).
207. Id. at 729-30.
208. Id. at 730.
209. Murphy v. State, 801 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
210. Id. at 919 (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981)).
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tion is when the accused initiates the second dialogue. 211 Recently, the
Supreme Court held that interrogation must stop when the accused requests
counsel. 21 2 Interrogation may not be re-initiated by officers outside the pres-
ence of the accused's attorney. 213 Since Murphy had requested counsel, it
was error for the officer to initiate further questioning. 21 4 The Court of
Criminal Appeals found the evidence to be harmful, since it directly contra-
dicted Murphy's testimony and, if believed, was possibly devastating to his
defense. 2 15
In a capital murder case, Robinson v. State,2 16 Robinson was convicted
and sentenced to death. The police explained Robinson's Miranda rights to
him when they arrested him. A magistrate later explained his rights a sec-
ond time. The police did so yet a third time. Robinson then gave a state-
ment. When the police read the statement back to him and asked Robinson
to sign it, Robinson asked if he needed to talk to a lawyer before he signed.
The officer told Robinson he could have one. Robinson said he was willing
to sign without a lawyer. The officer refused to allow Robinson to sign,
however, and again took him before a magistrate. The magistrate yet again
explained Robinson's Miranda rights. Robinson indicated that he under-
stood and wanted to sign the statement without first consulting an attorney.
In finding that the confession was valid, the Court of Criminal Appeals reit-
erated the circumstances under which officials may obtain a statement after
the accused has been given a Miranda warning. The prosecution must
demonstrate that the accused waived the rights voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently. 2 17 The burden of proof of the waiver is by a preponderance of
the evidence. 21 8 If a suspect, after being given the warnings, requests the
assistance of counsel, the interrogation must stop.2 19 The officials may not
re-initiate interrogation until an attorney for the suspect is present.220
Where a person's assertion of the right to counsel is equivocal, rather than
clear and unambiguous, cessation of interrogation is not automatically re-
quired. 22 1 The officials, however, may ask only questions aimed at discover-
ing whether the accused wants to proceed without counsel or actually wants
counsel.222 Robinson's statement requesting counsel was equivocal. The po-
lice limited further questioning to determining whether he desired counsel.
211. Id. (quoting Freeman v. State, 723 S.W.2d 727, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)).
212. Minnick v. Mississippi, I I l S.Ct. 486 (1990).
213. Id. at 491.
214. Murphy, 801 S.W.2d at 919.
215. Id. Note that in the same month the Court of Criminal Appeals referred to what a
"rational" court of appeals could find in performing a harm analysis. Hupp v. State, 801
S.W.2d 920, 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). This has not been a part of the harmless error
analysis applied by the Court of Criminal Appeals in the past. Its use here may signal a shift in
the court's test for harmless error.
216. Robinson v. State, No. 69,568, 1991 WL 57765 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 17, 1991) (not
yet released for publication).
217. Id. at *3 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966)).
218. Id. (citing Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168 (1986)).
219. Id. (quoting Minnick v. Mississippi, I I S.Ct. 486, 491 (1990)).
220. Id.
221. Id. (quoting Lucas v. State, 791 S.W.2d 35, 45 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)).
222. Id.
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Although Robinson indicated that he wanted to sign the statement, the of-
ficers waited until he was in front of a magistrate, where he indicated he did
not want counsel, before they let him sign the statement. The Court of
Criminal Appeals concluded that Robinson knowingly and intelligently
waived counsel. 223 The Court also found no Sixth Amendment violation for
the same reasons. 224
F White-Collar Crime
The Court of Criminal Appeals also considered a white-collar fraud case
which addressed whether regulatory disclosure requirements compel self-in-
crimination. In Bridwell v. State 225, Bridwell was convicted of failure to
disclose prior fraudulent dealings to two investors in drilling ventures.
Three witnesses testified that they had each invested $100,000 to $250,000
with Bridwell based on his representation that he and his cousin had been
successful in striking oil at a number of wells. Bridwell deposited a signifi-
cant portion of the invested funds into his personal bank accounts and used
the funds to pay outstanding debts and personal expenses. The complain-
ants in two of the cases indicated that if they had known of Bridwell's deal-
ings with a third investor, which occurred prior to their contact with
Bridwell, they would never have invested money with him. Bridwell argued
that the Texas Securities Act cannot require him to reveal prior uncharged
fraudulent conduct, because to do so would violate his privilege against self-
incrimination. The Court of Criminal Appeals found that the Texas Securi-
ties Act is not an effort to identify persons engaged in securities fraud, but
rather to ensure that investors receive full and fair disclosure. 226 The Securi-
ties Act does not require the person soliciting investments to divulge infor-
mation to the government, simply to those from whom the solicitor seeks
funds.227 Potential investors might or might not choose to contact the gov-
ernment.228 The Securities Act in no way forces the solicitor to make in-
criminating statements to those in the chain of prosecution. 229
G. Harmless Error Analysis
In Higginbotham v. State, another harm analysis case, the Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals reversed the Fourteenth Court of Appeals and remanded for a
new trial.230 Higginbotham had entered the offices of a church, carrying an
automatic pistol. He walked down the hall, passing people and warning
them to call an ambulance. He entered the minister's office and, after a loud
discussion, shot the minister. A short time later, Higginbotham went home.
He told people there he had shot a man. He said he needed help. He
223. Id.
224. Id. at *4.
225. Bridwell v. State, 804 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).




230. Higginbotham v. State, 807 S.W.2d 732, 738 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
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claimed to be the son of King David. He told them to call Pat Robertson,
then went into his house. He ultimately surrendered to police. The police
took Higginbotham to the police department. They gave him Miranda
warnings. He did not indicate he wanted a lawyer. When police officers
asked him if he would make a statement, he first spoke in tongues, then told
the officers he had shot a man and that witnesses saw him do it. The officers
then took him before a magistrate. Higginbotham requested an attorney.
Upon returning to the jail, police officers asked him again if he wanted to
talk to them. After two more Miranda warnings, Higginbotham gave a tape-
recorded oral confession. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals had found the
confession was improperly obtained, since it was obtained after Higginbot-
ham had requested an attorney before the magistrate.23 The court of ap-
peals also found that the admission of the confession was harmless because
of the abundance of overwhelming evidence, so that the confession was
merely cumulative. 232
On appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals, Higginbotham claimed that
the admission of his oral confession was harmful because it affected the
jury's rejection of his insanity defense due to evidence of his calm demeanor
while giving the confession. The Court of Criminal Appeals noted that an
appellate court must examine the entire record in a neutral, impartial, and
evenhanded manner in resolving the issue of whether error was harmful.233
The court rejected the standard applied by the court below that required a
reviewing court to view the record in the light most favorable to the prosecu-
tion.234 A neutral review of the evidence is necessary because error which
disparages a defense may be harmful, even though it would be harmless had
no defense been raised.23' The reviewing court must not focus on the propri-
ety of the outcome of the case. 236 It should instead be concerned with the
procedural integrity resulting in conviction. 237 The reviewing court should
consider several factors, including the source and nature of the error,
whether it was emphasized by the State and if so to what extent, and any
probable collateral implications. 238 The court should also consider the
weight a juror would likely place on the error.239 Finally, the court must
determine whether the State will be encouraged in its practices by a finding
of harmless error.24°
The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the error in Higginbotham
involved a principle of law familiar to law enforcement personnel. 24' The
231. Higginbotham v. State, 769 S.W.2d 265, 269-72 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1989), rev'd in part, 807 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
232. Id. at 274.
233. Higginbotham, 807 S.W.2d at 734 (quoting Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568, 585-86




237. Id. at 734-35.
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same two officers who originally questioned Higginbotham took him to the
magistrate's court. They continued to ask him questions after they took him
back to the interview room. In addition, the State had concentrated on Hig-
ginbotham's apparently rational conduct during the course of the tape-re-
corded interviews. Pointing out that this rational behavior was tantamount
to an argument that the confession showed Higginbotham was sane.242
Without the confession, the jury would have been less likely to conclude that
Higginbotham was sane, since the evidence also showed that Higginbotham
was hysterical and irrational immediately after the shooting.243 His medical
records confirmed that Higginbotham shifted between normalcy and ex-
treme paranoia. A jury could be more likely to harshly punish a calm and
unaffected defendant as opposed to one who showed remorse and distur-
bance after the crime. 244 Further, the jury emphasized the taped confession
in its deliberations. It asked to have the taped confession and a tape recorder
on which to play it. The jury deliberated for eight hours and was seques-
tered overnight before reaching a verdict. Finally, the use of a wrongfully
obtained confession to disparage the defendant's only defense threatens the
fair administration of justice. 245 It is possible that law enforcement will be
dissuaded from taking such confessions if the State is discouraged from using
them for any purpose.24 6 Accordingly, the Court of Criminal Appeals con-
cluded that it could not find beyond a reasonable doubt that the admission of
the tape recording made no contribution to Higginbotham's conviction or
punishment.247
H. The Exclusionary Rule
In Sossamon v. State248 Sossamon was a suspect in a number of aggra-
vated robberies in Montgomery County. When arrested, he offered to pro-
vide to Montgomery County authorities information implicating others who
were also responsible for the robberies. He told a Montgomery County
Sheriff's Deputy that he would provide information on aggravated robberies
in other counties in exchange for an agreement that he would not be prose-
cuted in those counties. The Montgomery County District Attorney agreed
to offer fourteen years or less on two Montgomery County cases and guaran-
teed that Sossamon would not be indicted on any further cases. The Mont-
gomery County Deputy then contacted authorities in Harris and McLennan
Counties, who agreed to the deal. Sossamon cooperated. Montgomery and
McLennan Counties did not prosecute. The Montgomery County Deputy
then contacted the Liberty County Sheriff's Office with the same offer. Ac-
cording to the Montgomery County Deputy, a detective with the Liberty
County Sheriff's Office told him that the Liberty County District Attorney
242. Id.
243. Id. at 737.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 738.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Sossaman v. State, 816 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
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agreed to grant Sossamon immunity. Sossamon gave a statement to the
Montgomery County Sheriff's Deputy. He implicated himself and others
involved in the case out of which the appeal arose. The offense occurred in
Liberty County.
Liberty County disputed the assertion that its District Attorney accepted
the agreement not to prosecute. Rather, the Liberty County District Attor-
ney's office had told the detective to have the Montgomery County District
Attorney contact the Liberty County District Attorney. Sossamon testified
that the Montgomery County Sheriff's Deputy promised immunity in Lib-
erty County. He said he would not have confessed if there had not been an
agreement of immunity from all prosecution. The State did not introduce
the confession into evidence. It relied on the eyewitness testimony of the
victim in obtaining the conviction. The Beaumont Court of Appeals re-
versed the conviction and entered a judgment of acquittal. 249 It concluded
that the State obtained both the indictment and the statement with a broken
promise of immunity.250 The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the Beau-
mont Court and remanded for a new trial.251 The court noted that the evi-
dence showed an immunity agreement between Sossamon and the
Montgomery County Sheriff's Department. 25 2 A rational trier of fact could
not have found an enforceable contract with Liberty County for immunity
from prosecution. 253 Accordingly, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed
the Beaumont court's acquittal order.254 Sossamon, however, believed that
he had reached an agreement with all parties. He gave his statement based
on that belief. Montgomery County gave the statement to Liberty County.
Liberty County used the statement to solve the offense. There was no evi-
dence of any immunity agreement with Liberty County, where Sossamon
was in fact prosecuted. The court concluded that the statement was involun-
tary because Sossamon thought he was receiving immunity from all prosecu-
tion when he gave it.2ss Since Liberty County did not introduce the
statement at trial, the court went on to analyze whether any fruits of the
confession were used against Sossamon. The court noted that there were no
suspects or leads in the Liberty County offense. No physical evidence tied
either Sossamon or his cohorts to the crime. None of the other participants
implicated by Sossamon was a suspect in the crime. The court concluded
that Sossamon's identity and presence in court were directly attributable to
his involuntary confession.256 It observed that "indirect fruits of an illegal
search or arrest should be suppressed where they bear a sufficiently close
relationship to the underlying illegality. ' 257 The court noted that the exclu-
249. Sossaman v. State, 740 S.W.2d 543, 547 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987), rev'd in part,
816 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
250. Id. at 545-46.
251. Sossaman, 816 S.W.2d at 349.
252. Id. at 344.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 345-46.
256. Id. at 348.
257. Id. at 346 (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)).
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sionary rule applies to violations of the Fifth Amendment as well as the
Fourth Amendment. 2 58 The court held that a trial court must exclude a
witness's in-court identification if it stems from a Fifth Amendment viola-
tion.2 9 It observed that penalties assessed against the State for violations of
law by its officers must have a relationship to the purpose the law is made to
serve.260 It concluded that application of the exclusionary rule would serve
a valid purpose by prohibiting authorities from getting a confession through
unkept promises of immunity and then using the confession to connect the
defendant with a crime victim. 26 1
258. Id. (citing Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 77-78 (1962)).
259. Id. at 348.
260. Id. at 346.
261. Id. at 349.
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